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Money provides liquidity services through a cash-in-advance constraint. The
exchange of commodities and assets extends over an inﬁnite horizon under un-
certainty and a complete asset market. Monetary policy sets the path of rates of
interest and accommodates the demand for balances. Competitive equilibria ex-
ist. But, for a ﬁxed path of rates of interest, there is a non-trivial multiplicity of
equilibrium paths of prices of commodities. Determinacy requires that, subject
to no-arbitrage and in addition to rates of interest, the prices of state-contingent
revenues be set.
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1.1
An immediate extension of the model of general competitive equilibrium of Ar-
row, Debreu and McKenzie encompasses monetary economies with an operative
transaction technology: a monetary authority supplies balances in exchange for
assets, through open market operations, and by lump-sum transfers to individ-
uals. Non-interest-bearing ﬁat money is dominated by interest-bearing nominal
assets as store of value. The demand of money resulting from its role in facili-
tating transactions, here a factual starting point.
A general equilibrium formulation of a monetary economy emancipates mon-
etary economics from the hypothesis of a representative individual, it allows for
distributional eﬀects and, possibly, for incomplete asset markets. This last ex-
tension is not treated here.
Monetary models typically involve economies that extend into the inﬁnite
future. The reason is commonly understood as a problem of consistency, em-
phasized by Hahn [21]. Suppose that a given supply of balances, ¯ m; serves as a










mi + p ¢ zi = ¯ mi;
where p are prices of commodities, zi is the net trade, r is the nominal rate of
interest and mi is the demand for balances. Holding money has an opportunity
cost measured by the nominal rate of interest. Equilibrium immediately requires













must be taxed away, as suggested by Lerner [24]. The amount that must be


















Over an inﬁnite horizon, this converges to zero and initial outside claims are
exhausted by transaction costs.
Recent formulations of a monetary economy have pointed out that an inﬁnite
horizon is not necessary in order for money to be valued at equilibrium. In
Dr` eze and Polemarchakis [13], ﬁat money is created at no cost by banks that
lend it to individuals and ﬁrms at nominal non-negative rates of interest. Banks
keep balanced accounts, so that outstanding money is the counterpart of assets,
claims on individuals and ﬁrms. Banks are owned and their proﬁts, equal to
interest earned on assets, accrue to shareholders. An alternative description
1is given by Dubey and Geanakoplos [14, 15], where proﬁts of banks are not
redistributed to individuals and the latter are endowed with initial nominal
balances. Both institutional arrangements avoid Hahn’s [21] paradox over a
ﬁnite horizon, since balances used in transactions, m; do not coincide with











can be satisﬁed by a non-vanishing supply of balances.1
Once proven to be consistent, ﬁnite time has the advantage of analytical
tractability. Still, the extension to an inﬁnite horizon, which motivates our
research in this paper, is of interest. First, in order to show that, when mov-
ing from a ﬁnite to an inﬁnite horizon, all qualitative conclusions are retained.
Second, in order to allow for speculative trade in long-term assets. Third, in
order to accommodate models commonly employed in contemporary monetary
economics. Last, but not least, in order to contrast equilibrium properties of
economies of ﬁnitely many inﬁnitely-lived individuals with economies of over-
lapping generations.
1.2
We consider an economy that extends to an inﬁnite future. Time is divided into
an inﬁnite number of dates. Uncertainty is described, following the canonical
model of Debreu [8], by an event tree.
Policies are represented by contingent plans. At every date, after information
is revealed, a public authority supplies balances at given nominal rates of interest
(monetary policy), trades in assets (portfolio policy), which allows for open
market operations, collects commodity taxes (ﬁscal policy) and makes transfers
to individuals (transfer policy).
A ﬁnite number of individuals hold initial claims and trade sequentially
in commodities, balances and assets. At every date, contingent on revealed
information, individuals adjust their holdings of assets and balances subject
to budget and solvency constraints; trade in commodities follows, subject to
a cash-in-advance or Clower [7] constraint. The asset market is sequentially
complete: all possible state-contingent revenues can be traded.
Our description encompasses the natural inﬁnite-horizon extensions of the
monetary economies of Dr` eze and Polemarchakis [13] and Dubey and Geanakop-
los [14, 15].2 Also, it reproduces, almost faithfully, the formulation of Woodford




are initial balances held by individuals




are interpreted as transfers of bank proﬁts to individuals and there are no initial balances.
The distinction between the exogeneity of initial holdings of balances, unlike the endogene-
ity of transfers of bank proﬁts, aﬀects the determinacy of equilibria and diﬀerentiates the
speciﬁcations.
2Dr` eze and Polemarchakis [13], however, consider a monetary economy over a ﬁnite horizon
with production and general transaction technology.
2[33] with a representative individual, which is, in turn, similar to the cash-
in-advance economies studied in Wilson [32] and Lucas and Stokey [26].3 All
diﬀerences among these previous studies obtain here as diﬀerences in the way
monetary and, possibly, ﬁscal policies are conducted.
Sequential completeness of the asset market serves to isolate the eﬀects of
liquidity constraints from those related to other obstacles to risk sharing and
intertemporal consumption smoothing. Admitting that balances can be read-
justed at every date, after information is revealed, eliminates any precautionary
demand and distinguishes the transaction and the asset role of money.
1.3
If the public authority sets the one-period, risk-free nominal rates of interest at
every date-event and it accommodates the demand for balances, suitable trans-
fers guarantee that competitive equilibria exist for arbitrary ﬁscal and portfolio
policies. In the terminology of Woodford [33, 34], the regime is Ricardian: as
prices of commodities and assets vary, transfers adjust to satisfy intertemporal
public budget constraints.
Alternatively, transfers are restricted: when negative transfers are ruled out,
in the presence of a positive initial public liability, existence requires positive
public revenues, coming from taxes and seignorage; without taxes, positive rev-
enues from seignorage needs transactions, which parallels the analogous condi-
tion in Dubey and Geanakoplos [15]. In the terminology of Woodford [33, 34],
the regime is non-Ricardian.
Interest rate policy does not suﬃce to determine the level and the path of
nominal prices of commodities and assets at equilibrium: the prices of contin-
gent revenues are unrestricted; so is the over-all price level; the latter, but not
the former, have real allocative eﬀects (in presence of initial nominal claims).
Determinacy, up to the over-all price level, requires that, beyond risk-free rates
of interest, also the prices of contingent revenues be somehow determined, sub-
ject to no-arbitrage constraints. Nominal determinacy results, as in the ﬁscal
theory of the price level (Woodford [33, 34] and Cochrane [11]), when there
are no transfers. Similarly, Dubey and Geanakoplos [14, 15], as well as Magill
and Quinzii [27], obtain determinacy, for economies with a ﬁnite horizon, by
adopting a non-Ricardian speciﬁcation.
The indeterminacy associated with interest rate policy has real eﬀects in
economies with an incomplete asset market over an inﬁnite horizon (Florenzano
and Gourdel [16], Hern´ andez and Santos [22], Levine and Zame [25] and Magill
and Quinzii [28]) modiﬁed so as to accommodate cash-in-advance constraints.
Nakajina and Polemarchakis [29] work out an example that illustrates the
indeterminacy of equilibrium with Ricardian policy and contrast it with the
determinacy that results from a non-Ricardian speciﬁcation. In addition, they
demonstrate that a monetary authority may attain determinacy by setting the
3Grandmont and Youn´ es [19, 20] study a temporary equilibrium of an economy under
certainty with cash-in-advance constraints, an inﬁnite horizon and heterogeneous individuals.




For a given countable set, A; the space of all real valued maps on A; `(A); is an
ordered vector space. Vector subspaces are the spaces of all bounded, `1 (A);
and summable, `1 (A); real valued maps on A; endowed with their respective
norms. A vector, x; is positive (strictly positive, uniformly strictly positive) if,
for every ® in A; x® ¸ 0 (x® > 0; x® ¸ ² > 0). It is decomposed into a positive,
x+ ¸ 0; and a negative, x¡ ¸ 0; part, so that x = x+ ¡ x¡: The positive cone
of an ordered vector space consists of all its positive vectors. 4
2.2
Time and the resolution of uncertainty are described by an event-tree, a count-
able set, S; endowed with a (partial) order, º : For every date-event, ¾; an
element of S; t¾ denotes its date. The unique initial date-event is Á; with
tÁ = 0: For a given date-event, ¾; ¾+ = f¿ Â ¾ : t¿ = t¾ + 1g denotes the set
of its immediate successors, a ﬁnite set; S¾ = f¿ 2 S : ¿ º ¾g the set of all its
(weak) successors, a subtree; St = f¾ 2 S : 0 · t¾ · tg the set all date-events
up to date t; St = f¾ 2 S : t¾ = tg the set all date-events at date t: The con-
struction is standard: see, for instance, Magill and Quinzii [28] and Santos and
Woodford [30].
2.3
At every date-event, markets are open for commodities, assets and balances,
which are num´ eraire. At every date-event, there is a ﬁnite set, N; of tradable
commodities, which are perfectly divisible and perishable. Consistently, the
commodity space coincides with the space of all bounded real valued maps on
S £ N and prices of commodities, p; are a positive real valued map on S £ N:
The asset market is sequentially complete. A portfolio, holdings of assets,
is described by its payoﬀs across date-events, v; a real valued map on S: Prices
of assets are state prices, the prices of revenues across date-events, a; a strictly
positive real valued map on S , normalized so that aÁ = 1: At a date-event, a







State prices are also commonly called prices of elementary Arrow securities.
4For details, see Aliprantis and Border [1]. Notice that, throughout the paper, we use the
term ‘positive’ (‘negative’) to mean ‘greater or equal than zero’ (‘less or equal than zero’).
4At given state prices, one-period, nominal rates of interest, r , a positive









Indeed, since balances are storable, no-arbitrage requires that nominal rates of
interest be positive.
2.4
There is a ﬁnite set of individuals. An individual, i; is described by preferences,
ºi; over the consumption space, the positive cone of the commodity space, and
an endowment, ei; of commodities, an element of the consumption space. We
make two common assumptions on preferences and endowments of commodities.
Assumption 2.1 (Preferences) The preferences of every individual are con-
tinuous (in the relative Mackey topology), convex and strictly monotone.
Assumption 2.2 (Endowments) The endowment of every individual is uni-
formly strictly positive.
Continuity of preferences in the Mackey topology, introduced in Bewley [4], is
a strong requirement.5 In particular, it implies that the individual is impatient:
suﬃciently distant modiﬁcations, even unbounded ones, of consumption plans
do not reverse the order of preference. Uniform impatience across individuals
would be a stronger requirement. The much stronger assumption of a uniform
rate of impatience across date-events, in the recent literature on incomplete
asset markets over an inﬁnite horizon (Hern´ andez and Santos [22] and Magill
and Quinzii [28]), is not needed here.6








where ¹¾ is the probability of ¾; 0 < ¯ < 1 is the discount factor, and ui is a bounded,
continuous, increasing, concave real valued map on `(N) with ui (0) = 0:
6Alternatively, one could include unbounded maps in the commodity space and preferences
could be required to be continuous in the product topology. By rescaling units of measurement
of diﬀerent commodities, which does not aﬀect continuity in the product topology, one can
always suppose that the aggregate endowment is bounded. For the purposes of equilibrium
theory, one need not consider individual consumptions that exceed this bound, though this
may be contrary to the spirit of competitive equilibrium, since individuals might, indeed, con-
template unbounded consumption plans. Pursuing this direction, continuity in the product
topology restricted to consumption plans uniformly bounded by the aggregate endowment is
equivalent to continuity in the Mackey topology; this amounts to the impatience of individ-
uals exceeding the rate of growth of the aggregate endowment. The stronger assumption of
continuity in the product topology, as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis [18], keeps separate
restrictions on preferences and restrictions on endowments.
52.5
A public authority (or a government, or a central bank) conducts monetary,
ﬁscal, transfers and portfolio policies. The supply of balances, m; a positive
real valued map on S; is contingent on dates and information. Monetary policy
consists of nominal rates of interest, r; that are set, while the supply of balances
accommodates demand. Although our analysis could be adapted to cope with all
arbitrarily set nominal rates of interest, we impose a restriction that facilitates
presentation.
Assumption 2.3 (Monetary policy) Nominal rates of interest, r; are (uni-
formly) bounded.




; bounded positive real valued
maps on S £ N: In the aggregate, taxes are g =
P
i gi: We require consistency
between monetary and ﬁscal policy, which is needed both to avoid problems of
solvency, when individuals hold initial nominal debts, and to carry out a limit
argument for the proof of existence of equilibria.7






is uniformly strictly positive.
Transfer policy consists of lump-sum nominal transfers to individuals, (:::;
hi;:::
¢
; real valued maps on S: In the aggregate, transfers are h =
P
i hi:
To avoid additional, redistributive indeterminacy, we assume that aggregate





Moreover, we restrict transfers policies obtain well-deﬁned present values at
every date-event.
Assumption 2.5 (Transfer policy) Transfers are distributed to individuals




¸ 0; such that
P
i ³i = 1: Moreover,
given state prices, a; at every date-event, the sum of present value transfers, P
¿2S¾ a¿h¿; converges.
Trade in assets by the public authority is described by public liabilities, w;
a real valued map on S; with a given initial value, wÁ = ±: The initial public
7For a real valued map, x; on S and a real valued map, z; on S £ N; xz = zx is the



























are used for notational convenience.





that is, ± =
P
i ±i: To simplify the presentation, at no loss of realism, we assume
that there is a strictly positive initial public liability.
Assumption 2.6 (Public liability) The initial public liability, ±; is strictly
positive.










a¿w¿ = w¾ + h¾ ¡ p¾ ¢ g¾:
Portfolio policy sets the composition of the public portfolio, but not its mag-
nitude, at every date-event: it is represented by Θ; a real valued map on S;
and imposes the additional restriction that (w¿ : ¿ 2 ¾+) belong to the span of
(Θ¿ : ¿ 2 ¾+):8
Assumption 2.7 (Portfolio policy) At every date-event, the vector (Θ¿ :
¿ 2 ¾+) is positive and non-zero.
Our representation of public policies incorporates a minimal requirement of
consistency. Indeed, arbitrarily set policies determine, through the sequential
public budget constraint, the evolution of public liabilities, for all given prices
and demands of balances. For every date-event, ¾ , public liability at every














However, given policies might not satisfy an intertemporal public budget con-
straint at all prices and at all demands of balances.
Remark 2.1 Consolidated budget constraints are consistent with a speciﬁca-
tion of mutually independent monetary and ﬁscal authorities. Suppose that v
and u represent, respectively, the liabilities of the monetary and ﬁscal authori-
ties. The central bank is an institution which issues balances and runs balanced
accounts: outstanding money, m; is matched by claims on individuals or the
government, that is, v = 0: The bank is owned by individuals or the govern-
ment and distributes dividends, d; to share-holders: the imposition of balanced






8In general, diﬀerent constraints on portfolios (that is, for instance, (w¿ ¡ m¾ : ¿ 2 ¾+)
belongs to the span of (Θ¿ : ¿ 2 ¾+)) would lead to inconsistencies.






















¸ 0 are, respectively, the shares of
individuals and the government into the central bank. }
2.6
















































where initial nominal claims are predetermined by the condition wi
Á = ±i: In the
budget constraint, the nominal interest rate represents the opportunity cost of
holding wealth in liquid form. Equivalently, here, of collecting proceeds of sales
with a one-period lag.
Remark 2.2 Our constraints coincide with those of Woodford [33] and, in a
ﬁnite horizon, with those of Dubey and Geanakoplos [15]. Liquidity constraints
correspond to cash-in-advance. At every date, after information is acquired,
¾; an individual has nominal claims wi
¾; receives a transfer hi
¾ and pays taxes
p¾ ¢gi
¾: He purchases a portfolio, with payoﬀs
¡
vi
¿ : ¿ 2 ¾+
¢
; and balances ni
¾ so









¾ ¡ p¾ ¢ gi
¾:
































8Remark 2.3 Solvency constraints serve to eliminate Ponzi schemes. They are
equivalent to the restriction that an individual can incur any amount of nominal
debt that can be repayed in ﬁnite time. The value of the endowment in com-
modities at a date-event is taxed at the nominal interest rate, since revenues
from sales are carried over in the form of balances that do not earn interest. }
For an individual, a plan consists of a consumption plan, xi; balances, mi;
and asset holdings, wi: The sequential budget set is the set of all consumption
plans which satisfy the sequential budget, liquidity and solvency constraints, for
some balances and asset holdings, given initial nominal claims.
3 Equilibrium
For given monetary and ﬁscal policies, an equilibrium consists of portfolio and
transfer policies, plans for individuals, prices of commodities and state prices
(consistent with set nominal rates of interest) such that: (a) the plan of every
individual is optimal subject to sequential budget, liquidity and solvency con-
straints, given initial nominal claims; (b) at every date-event, market clearing













where public liabilities, w; satisfy public sequential budget constraints at bal-
ances demanded by individuals, m =
P
i mi; given initial public liability.
4 Consolidation
Since the asset market is complete, the sequence of budget constraints faced by
an individual reduces to a single constraint at the initial date-event.
Lemma 4.1 At equilibrium, present value prices of commodities, ap; are a
summable real valued map on S £ N:




























9Lemma 4.2 At equilibrium, a consumption plan is attainable under sequential
budget, liquidity and solvency constraints if and only if it is attainable under the
unique intertemporal budget constraint and sequential liquidity constraints. Op-
timality of a consumption plan requires that the intertemporal budget constraint






















As the liquidity constraint is binding whenever the nominal rate of interest






















±i + ³i P
¾2S a¾h¾ ¡
P
¾2S ¼¾ ¢ gi;
where ¼ = ap are present value prices of commodities, a summable positive real






















which is the intertemporal public budget ‘constraint’. It is clear that state prices
are of no allocative relevance, unless transfer policy is arbitrarily set.
5 Existence and Determinacy
We successively address the issues of existence of an equilibrium, determinacy of
the overall price level and determinacy of rates of inﬂation. In proving existence
of an equilibrium, monetary, ﬁscal and, possibly, portfolio policies are given
exogenously, whereas transfer policies are endogenous and, possibly, subject to
additional restrictions. The determinacy of rates of inﬂation is studied for given
portfolio policies, since, otherwise, a full indeterminacy, up to consistency with
set nominal rates of interest, always obtains.
In addition to all already stated hypotheses, conditions for existence of an
equilibrium are distinguished according to their speciﬁc role. Those for public
solvency ensure that intertemporal public budget can be balanced, at the outset,
at some overall price level, when one restricts transfers to be positive or one does
not allow for transfers at all. Those for private solvency guarantee that every
individual is able to honor the initial debt when the overall price level is varied
subject to public solvency. Finally, those for public debt consistency ensures that
10public solvency obtains sequentially, at every date-event, under given portfolio
policy.
Existence requires that initial public liability, which is nominal, be covered
by public revenues, consisting of seignorage and taxes, which are real, and,






















If negative transfers are allowed, this restriction is vacuous: negative trans-
fers can always be issued so as to guarantee a balanced intertemporal budget.
When negative transfers are not allowed, under strictly positive, but otherwise
arbitrary, real revenues, a suﬃciently high price level permits covering an arbi-
trary initial liability. However, if there are no taxes, public solvency requires
seignorage, which might fail to be strictly positive: consistently, conditions for
individuals to be willing to hold balances, at set strictly positive nominal rates
of interest, are to be explicitly considered.
Assumption 5.1 (Public solvency) One of the following conditions holds:
1. Negative transfers are allowed.
2. Fiscal policy is non-zero.
3. Monetary policy is strictly positive and trade occurs at equilibrium.
Trade at equilibrium occurs when gains to trade are higher than transac-
tion costs related to nominal rates of interest, as pointed out by Dubey and
Geanakoplos [14, 15]. The issue is further investigated below when we carry out
a duality analysis.
Assumption 5.2 (Trade at equilibrium) There exists an allocation, ¡
:::;xi;:::
¢




















































is to be ensured by a high enough overall price level. When transfers are issued,
intertemporal public budget can be balanced at all high enough price levels
and, therefore, private solvency can be guaranteed. If transfers are not issued,
however, the overall price level serves to balance intertemporal public budget
and, consequently, private solvency might fail when there are initial nominal
debts.
11Assumption 5.3 (Private solvency) One of the following conditions holds:
1. Positive transfers are allowed.
2. Initial nominal claims of individuals are positive.
As time evolves, public liabilities are determined by portfolio policy. They






















If negative transfers can be issued, this restriction is vacuous. When transfers
can only be positive, situations in which public real revenues vanish must be
ruled out. If transfers are not allowed, in addition, situations in which public
liabilities vanish must be ruled out as well.
Assumption 5.4 (Public debt consistency) One of the following conditi-
ons holds:
1. Negative transfers are allowed.
2. Positive transfers are allowed and ﬁscal policy is strictly positive.
3. Portfolio and ﬁscal policies are strictly positive.
Equilibrium exists for given monetary and ﬁscal policies when public and pri-
vate solvency is guaranteed. With unrestricted transfer policy, solvency requires
no additional conditions. With positive transfer policy and without transfer pol-
icy, public solvency requires positive public revenue, either taxes or seignorage.
In addition, without transfer policy, private solvency is only guaranteed if there
are no initial private nominal debts. For given portfolio policy, with positive
transfers policy and without transfer policy, the existence of an equilibrium
might fail when public revenue is not positive at every date-event.
Proposition 5.1 (Existence) For given monetary and ﬁscal policies, under
solvency conditions, an equilibrium exists with unrestricted transfer policy, with
positive transfer policy or without transfer policy. For given monetary, ﬁscal
and portfolio policies, under solvency and public debt consistency conditions, an
equilibrium exists with unrestricted transfer policy, with positive transfers policy
or without transfer policy.
With unrestricted transfer policy and positive transfer policy, there is in fact
a multiplicity of equilibria, corresponding to the overall price level, up to a lower
bound accounting for solvency of individuals and, possibly, positivity of trans-
fers. One may also argue that, generically, if trade occurs, such a multiplicity
is of real allocative relevance.
12Proposition 5.2 (Overall Price Level) For given monetary, ﬁscal and port-
folio policies, under solvency and public debt consistency conditions, a multiplic-
ity of equilibria exists with unrestricted transfer policy or with positive transfers
policy. Such a multiplicity can be indexed by the overall price level, up to a lower
bound which guarantees solvency of every individual and, if required, positivity
of transfers.
Up to consistency with nominal rates of interest, state prices, of no allocative
relevance, are indeterminate, unless transfers are ruled out and, in addition, the



















¼¿ ¢ g¿ = a¾w¾;
where all terms, but state price, are predetermined, thus adding additional


















¼¿ ¢ g¿ ¸ a¾w¾;
leaving, consequently, state prices partly indeterminate.
The indeterminacy of state prices, subject to consistency with nominal rates
of interest, translates into an indeterminacy of rates of inﬂation, subject to
Fisher Equations. Indeed, given (strictly positive) present value prices of com-
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Proposition 5.3 (Rates of Inﬂation) For given monetary, ﬁscal and portfo-
lio policies, with unrestricted transfer policy or with positive transfer policy, state
prices are indeterminate, up to consistency with nominal rates of interest and,
if required, positivity of transfers. These are (countably)inﬁnitely many degrees
of purely nominal multiplicity, corresponding to the variability of inﬂation rates,
up to consistency with Fisher Equations and, if required, positivity of transfers.
For given monetary, ﬁscal and portfolio policies, without transfer policy, state
prices are determinate, subject to strict positivity of public liabilities.
Determinacy of the overall price level and of state prices corresponds to the
ﬁscal theory of price determination (for example, Cochrane [11] and Woodford
[33, 34]). It bears similarities, furthermore, with the determinacy of monetary
equilibria obtained by Dubey and Geanakoplos [15] under given money supply,
since it is there equivalent to a control on the nominal rate of interest.
136 Eﬃciency
Neither of the Welfare Theorems holds in a monetary economy under strictly
positive nominal rates of interest: (a) equilibrium allocations, in general, fail
to be Pareto eﬃcient; (b) Pareto eﬃcient allocations cannot, in general, be
sustained as equilibrium allocations (though they can under suitable redistri-
butions of endowments of commodities). More importantly, one can construct
robust examples of economies exhibiting Pareto-ranked equilibria at given nomi-
nal rates of interest.9 The concept of constrained eﬃciency suitable for monetary
economies is not evident. The next section, which may be seen as a digression,
is devoted to a related duality property.
7 Duality
We carry out a duality analysis using an auxiliary notion of supportability. One
may be interested in such an analysis for two reasons: (a) it allows us to provide
a characterization of equilibria without any explicit reference to prices; (b) it
gives a better understanding of the displacement from Pareto eﬃciency caused
by liquidity constraints. Throughout, nominal rates of interest are considered














It is said to be supportable (respectively, weakly supportable) if there is no Pareto




































Notice that supportability is deﬁned for given nominal rates of interest and
endowments of commodities. The latter seems unavoidable if the notion is to
be suitable for a duality analysis.
Clearly, every supportable feasible allocation is also weakly supportable. The
converse is true as well since preferences are continuous and strictly monotone.
9There are two individuals and two commodities. Let r > 0 be given. Individual 1’s
preferences are represented by x1
1 + (1 + r)¡1 x1
2 and endowments are (0;1): Individual 2’s
preferences are represented by (1 + r)¡1 x2
1 + x2
2 and endowments are (1;0): A symmetric
allocation is represented by 0 · µ · 1; with consumptions x1
µ = (µ;1 ¡ µ) and x2
µ = (1 ¡ µ;µ):






is an equilibrium with prices ¼µ =
(1;1): There is actually a continuum of equilibria, for a symmetric distribution of initial
nominal claims, ranking from the no-trade to the symmetric Pareto-eﬃcient allocation. All
of them, but no trade, can be sustained as equilibria with symmetric strictly positive initial
claims.
14Lemma 7.1 A feasible allocation is supportable if and only if it is weakly sup-









We now establish a variation on the First Welfare Theorem.
Proposition 7.1 (First ‘Welfare’ Theorem) Every equilibrium allocation
is supportable.


































If an allocation is supported by some present value prices of commodities, con-
sumption plans of individuals are (weakly) optimal at those prices.
We can now present a formulation of the Second Welfare Theorem.
Proposition 7.2 (Second ‘Welfare’ Theorem) Every supportable feasible
allocation is supported by some (non-zero) present value prices of commodities.
Supportability can be interpreted as the absence of retrading beneﬁts if trade
were physically costly, as pointed out by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2001).




be a supportable feasible


























A supportable feasible allocation coincides with a Pareto-eﬃcient no-trade
allocation of an economy with redistributed initial endowments and a costly
trading, or marketing, technology, as in Foley [17]. In such an economy, com-
petitive ﬁrms, or intermediaries, produce (net) trades across individuals using
a linear technology, which involves some destruction of resources (in our cases,
such costs corresponds to liquidity costs). It should be clear, however, that
an equilibrium allocation does not, in general, correspond to a Pareto eﬃcient
allocation of an economy where transactions involve real costs, since liquidity
costs have in fact no real counterpart.
158 Comments
8.1
Our approach generalizes the representative-individual cash-in-advance econ-
omy to a true equilibrium setting with heterogeneous individuals and sequential
trade. It provides a promising alternative to overlapping generations economies
and the self-insurance economy of Bewley [5] for addressing issues of monetary
theory and macroeconomics.
A simple Clower constraint captures the transaction role of money.10 We
show the existence of a competitive equilibrium when a monetary authority sets
nominal rates of interest under the assumption of a sequentially complete asset
market. Further research is to be devoted to the issue of existence under the
control of monetary quantities. Furthermore, asset market incompleteness and
incomplete information are relevant issues to be explored. A major diﬃculty
emerges, it should be noticed, when one introduces markets for contingent com-
modities, real assets and, in general, any contractual arrangement involving the
delivery of commodities.
8.2
Our Propositions 5.2 and 5.3 point to limited relevance of the ﬁscal theory
of the price level (Woodford [33, 34] and Cochrane [11]), given that surplus
disposability (that is, public budget surplus can be distributed to individuals
through transfers) is an innocuous assumption.
8.3
In an economy with heterogeneous individuals, the occurrence of sunspot ﬂuc-
tuations need not be related to indeterminacy. Under interest rate pegging,
extrinsic uncertainty might still aﬀect the real allocation of resources at equilib-
rium even though nominal rates of interest are not contingent at all.11 Nominal
rates of interest put bounds on the variability of consumptions across sunspot
states.
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Proof of Lemma 4.1
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is ﬁnite as well, which, using interiority assumptions, proves the claim.
Proof of Lemma 4.2
Suppose that a plan
¡
xi;mi;wi¢
satisﬁes sequential budget, liquidty and sol-
vency constraints, given initial nominal claims. Multiplication of the sequential
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¾2S a¾p¾ ¢ gi
¾:
Since the left-hand side is bounded, the ﬁrst term is non-decreasing and the





























satisfy the intertemporal budget constraint and sequential
liquidity constraints.
Conversely, suppose that a plan
¡
xi;mi¢
satisﬁes the intertemporal budget











































































To see that sequential budget constraints are satisﬁed as well, observe that, at



















¾ ¡ p¾ ¢ gi
¾:
At the initial date-event, the intertemporal budget constraint and the deﬁnition
















· ±i + hi
Á ¡ pÁ ¢ gi
Á:
At an optimal plan, the intertemporal budget constraint must hold with
equality since preferences are strictly monotone. Moreover, it is clear that the
liquidity constraint is non-binding only if the nominal rate of interest is zero.
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Proof of Propositions 5.1-5.3
Outline
The proof is organized as follows. First, we show that, at equilibrium, present
value prices of commodities can be determined independently of state prices.
Second, we show that there is a multiplicity of state prices compatible with a
given equilibrium allocation provided that transfers are allowed.
Abstract Equilibrium
Let Xi be the consumption space of individual i; the positive cone of `1 (S£
N); and Π the space of normalized present value prices of commodities, the
subset of the positive cone of `1 (S £ N) satisfying the normalization k¼k1 = 1:
For (¼;x) in `1 (S £ N)£`1 (S £ N); ¼¢x =
P
¾2S ¼¾ ¢x¾ denotes the duality
operation.
We consider the following abstract notion of equilibrium: it consists of





gate transfer, ¯; and a positive index for the overall price level, ¹; such that:







(b) for every individual,































¡ ¼ ¢ gi:
To oﬀset the redundancy stemming from the choice of the unit of account, we
add the normalization ¼ 2 Π: Notice that, in an abstract equilibrium, ¹ = 0 is
allowed.
Truncation
Suppose that all vector spaces are ﬁnite-dimensional, which corresponds to a
truncated economy. We show that an abstract equilibrium exists for some trans-
fer ¯ when individuals possibly hold initial debt positions. Choose any positive
21¹ small enough for nonemptyness of the budget constraint of every individual
evaluated at ¯ = ¡± and at all normalized present value prices of commodities.







2 ¢¢¢ £ Xi £ ¢¢¢ £ Π £ B = F;
where Xi is consumption space of individual i; Π is the space of normalized
present value prices and B = f¯ ¸ ¡±g . And the correspondence ˆ f ³ ¯ f
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ˆ xi ¡ ei¢¡
+ ˆ ¼ ¢ g = ¹(± + ¯);





ˆ xi ¡ ei¢
:
A ﬁxed point exists and it can be shown to be an abstract equilibrium of the
truncated economy. Therefore, in a truncated economy, an abstract equilibrium
exists for all arbitrarily chosen strictly positive ¹ small enough.
Suppose now that no individual holds an initial debt position. Choose any







2 ¢¢¢ £ Xi £ ¢¢¢ £ Π £ M = F;
where Xi is consumption space of individual i; Π is the space of normalized
present value prices and M = f¹ ¸ 0g: And the correspondence ˆ f ³ ¯ f deﬁned
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ˆ xi ¡ ei¢¡
+ ˆ ¼ ¢ g = ¹(± + ¯);





ˆ xi ¡ ei¢
:
A ﬁxed point exists and it can be shown to be an abstract equilibrium of the
truncated economy. Therefore, in a truncated economy, an abstract equilibrium
exists for all arbitrarily chosen positive ¯; allowing for ¹ = 0:
22Limit
For a vector, x; in `1 (S £ N) (`1 (S £ N)), let xt denote its truncation at t:
That is, xt
¾ = x¾; if 0 · t¾ · t; and xt
¾ = 0; otherwise.
We make now truncation explicit. A t-truncated economy is constructed
as follows: preferences on the consumption space, Xi; the positive cone of
`1 (S £ N); are recovered using xi ºi







; truncated present value prices of commodities are elements of
Πt = f¼ 2 Π : ¼t = ¼g; where Π contains all positive vectors, ¼; in `1 (S £ N)
such that k¼k1 = 1:






; present value prices of commodities are ¼t; trans-






: Notice that, along the sequence, one controls either for
¹t or for ¯t; as made clear by the proof of existence of abstract equilibria in







¼t ¢ ei ¡ ¼t ¢ gi ¸ ² > 0:
This, indeed, follows from interiority assumptions and boundedness of nominal
rates of interest. We refer to such inequalities as solvency conditions.
Letting










¼t and 't can be viewed as elements of ba(S £ N); the norm dual of `1 (S £ N)
consisting of all ﬁnitely additive set functions on S £ N and endowed with the
dual norm k¢kba (the norm of bounded variation). Let ¾ (ba;`1) denote the
weak¤ topology of ba(S £ N): Since
k'tk1 = k'tkba · k¼tkba = k¼tk1 = 1
and since, by Alaoglu Theorem, the unit sphere in ba(S £ N) is ¾ (ba;`1) com-
pact, without loss of generality, f¼tg and f'tg converge to ¼ and '; respectively,
in the ¾ (ba;`1) topology. Moreover, both ¼ and '; as well as ¼¡'; are positive
elements of ba(S £ N) and 0 < k'kba · k¼kba = 1:






xi in the product topology. Since the product and the Mackey topology coincide






to xi in the Mackey topology.
As sequences f¯tg and f¹tg can be assumed to be bounded, without loss of





it follows that every ®i
t converges to ®i:
The proof, which is presented in a sequence of steps, uses standard argu-
ments.
231
Decomposition. Since ¼ (') is a positive linear functional, it follows from Yosida-
Hewitt Theorem that there is a unique decomposition ¼ = ¼f+¼b (' = 'f+'b ),
where ¼f ('f) is a positive functional in `1 (S £ N); the Mackey-topology dual
of `1 (S £ N); and ¼b ('b) is a positive ﬁnitely additive measure (a pure charge)
vanishing on all vectors having only a ﬁnite number of non-zero components.
2
zi ºi xi implies
¼ ¢ gi + ¼ ¢
¡
zi ¡ ei¢+




For a strictly positive real number, ¸; zi+¸ei Âi
t xi
t for all t large enough, which
implies that
¼t ¢ gi + ¼t ¢
¡
zi ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)ei¢+
¸ ®i
t + 't ¢
¡
zi ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)ei¢¡
:
Taking the limit, one obtains
¼ ¢ gi + ¼ ¢
¡
zi ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)ei¢+
¸ ®i + ' ¢
¡
zi ¡ (1 ¡ ¸)ei¢¡
:
As lattice operations are continuous in the norm topology and ¼ and ' are
norm-continuous linear functionals, letting ¸ go to zero, the claim is proven.
3.
zi Âi xi implies
¼ ¢ gi + ¼ ¢
¡
zi ¡ ei¢+




Continuity of preferences implies that ¸zi Âi xi for some 0 < ¸ < 1: Since
¼ ¢ gi + ¸¼ ¢
¡
zi ¡ ei¢

























' ¢ ei ¡ ¼ ¢ gi + ®i¢
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where the last inequality follows from solvency conditions.
244.
¼b = 'b = 0 and
¼ ¢ gi + ¼ ¢
¡
xi ¡ ei¢+




By our assumptions of interiority,







¸ ´ > 0:
In the limit,







¸ ´ > 0
and, using truncations, one can show that








It follows that ¼b = 0 implies 'b = 0:
Suppose that ¼b > 0; so that, by interiority assumptions, 'b ¢ ei ¡ ¼b ¢ gi =
» > 0: Since xi;t + ¸ei;t Âi xi for all t large enough and all strictly positive real
numbers, ¸;
¼ ¢ gi + ¼ ¢
³¡
xi ¡ ei¢+´t
+ ¸¼ ¢ ei;t ¸
¼ ¢ gi + ¼ ¢
¡
xi;t + ¸ei;t ¡ ei¢+
¸
®i + ' ¢
¡
xi;t + ¸ei;t ¡ ei¢¡
¸
®i + ' ¢
³¡
xi ¡ ei¢¡´t




In the limit, one obtains
¼f ¢ gi + ¼f ¢
¡
xi ¡ ei¢+
+ ¸(¼f ¡ 'f) ¢ ei ¸
®i + 'f ¢
¡
xi ¡ ei¢¡
+ 'b ¢ ei ¡ ¼b ¢ gi ¸





¼f ¢ gi + ¼f ¢
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xi ¡ ei¢+




To prove equality, notice that, for all 0 · s · t;












25Therefore, in the limit,
¼f ¢ gi + ¼f ¢
¡
xi ¡ ei¢+














Observe that, for all 0 · s · t;































thus proving the claim.
Equilibrium
Under conditions stated in section 5, we show that, for given monetary, ﬁscal
and portfolio policies, when ¹ > 0; abstract equilibria correspond to sequential
equilibria under the following qualiﬁcations:
(a) for some transfer policy;
(b) for some positive transfer policy, when ¯ ¸ 0;
(c) without transfer policy, when ¯ = 0:
(a)
Along the sequence of abstract equilibria of truncated economies, one can as-
sume that ¹t = ¹ > 0 for all t and, possibly rescaling present value prices of





































+ ¼¾ ¢ g¾:
For arbitrarily set state prices, a; consistent with nominal rates of interest, and
a strictly positive real number, ½; by induction, deﬁne a real valued map on S;




































where S¾;t = f¿ º ¾ : t¿ ¡ t¾ = tg and St
¾ = f¿ º ¾ : 0 · t¿ ¡ t¾ · tg: Setting



























which ensures consistency of the construction.
At given state prices, a; prices of commodities are a¾p¾ = ¼¾ and, at every
date-event, balances and assets holdings of individuals are, respectively,
mi































27At every date-event, thus, summing across individuals, market clearing on assets
markets is given by
a¾ (w¾ + b¾) = u¾:
By induction, assuming that market clearing holds at all date-events, ¾; in












































thus proving the claim.
(b)
We ﬁrst show that, for all small enough ¹ > 0; there is an abstract equilibrium
with associated transfer ¯¹ > 0: Indeed, for every small enough ¹ > 0; there
is an abstract equilibrium with associated transfer ¯¹: Suppose that, letting
¹ vanish, there is a sequence of abstract equilibria with associated transfers
¡± · ¯¹ · 0: One can show that, possibly using subsequences, the limit is also










+ ¼ ¢ g = 0:
Since present value prices of commodities are strictly positive in every abstract
equilibrium, one is to assume that ﬁscal policy is zero, for, otherwise, a contra-

































By strict monotonicity of preferences, one can also assume that, for every indi-
vidual, zi Âi ei: It follows that, for every individual,
¼ ¢
³





































a contradiction. Therefore, as ¹ vanishes, associated transfers are strictly posi-
tive.
For given strictly positive portfolio policy (if portfolio policy is not strictly
positive, some minor modiﬁcations are required), when taxes are strictly pos-
itive, one modiﬁes the preceding proof so as to take into account positivity of
transfers. If state prices are consistently deﬁned at all date-events, ¾; in St;







This can be done since, by strict positivity of ﬁscal policy, u is strictly pos-
itive and, by strict positivity of portfolio policy, state prices result uniquely












which shows that transfers are positive at all date-events, since ¯ can be as-
sumed to be positive. When ¯ is strictly positive, there are inﬁnitely many
perturbations of these values of state prices which still respect positivity of
transfers.
(c)
When there are no initial nominal debt, one can assume that, in an abstract
equilibrium, ¯ = 0: To verify that ¹ > 0; one uses either the fact that taxes are
nonzero or the condition on trade at equilibrium, as done for case (b) above.
Moreover, when taxes are strictly positive, for given portfolio policy, state prices
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;
in addition to consistency with nominal rates of interest.





be a weakly supportable feasible allocation and suppose that









satisﬁes adapted feasibility. In particular, assume that zj Âj xj; so that µ =
29¡
zj ¡ xj¢+
> 0 by the strict monotonicity of preferences. For a positive small
real number ®; deﬁne















where n is the number of individuals. The number ® can be chosen so small as to
satisfy yi Âi xi; for all individuals, because preferences are Mackey-continuous
















































is a supportable feasible allocation.












Deﬁne, for each individual, zi = xi+n¡1µ; where n is the number of individuals,
and notice that, by the strict monotonicity of preferences, zi Âi xi: Summing


























Proof of Proposition 7.1




is an equilibrium allocation and
















































Since ¼ is a positive linear functional, a contradiction is obtained.
30Proof of Proposition 7.2




is a weakly supportable










2 Xi : zi 2 Xi and zi Âi xi
¾
:
Clearly, Fi; by the strict monotonicity of preferences, has a nonempty interior


























1 Âi xi: For every 0 < ¸ < 1; deﬁne fi
































































it follows that zi
¸ belongs to the consumption space Xi: Convexity and mono-
tonicity of preferences then guarantee that zi
¸ ºi (1 ¡ ¸)zi
0 + ¸zi
1 Âi xi; thus
implying that fi
¸ is an element of Fi:



















is a weakly supportable feasible allo-
cation. One can then apply the Separating Hyperplane Theorem, which gives
a norm-continuous non-zero linear functional ¼ on `1 (S £ N) such that, for
all f in F; ¼ ¢ f ¸ 0: Since F contains the positive cone, ¼ is a positive
31functional. Therefore, Yosida-Hewitt Decomposition Theorem allows one to
write ¼ = ¼f + ¼b; where ¼f is a norm-continuous positive linear functional on
`1 (S £ N) admitting a sequence representation (thus, a Mackey-continuous
positive linear functional on `1 (S £ N)) and ¼b is a positive purely ﬁnitely
additive measure. We show that ¼f is non-zero and separates.


































Mackey-continuity of preferences implies that zi;t +
¡
ei ¡ ei;t¢



























































Taking the limit and using the Mackey continuity of ¼f; one establishes that
¼f ¢ f ¸ 0:



















































is an element of F: Separation, therefore, gives



















where the last strict inequality follows from interiority assumptions and bound-
edness of nominal rates of interest. By contradiction, this proves that ¼f > 0:
Fix an individual j and suppose that zj ºj xj: Deﬁne, for all other individ-




















32is an element of F: As f¸ converges to f0 in the Mackey-topology (lattice opera-
tions are Mackey-continuous) and ¼f is a Mackey-continuous linear functional,
one obtains















thus establishing the claim.









and satisﬁes the in-










is positive, it follows that
X
i
zi +
X
i
µ
r
1 + r
¶³¡
zi ¡ ei¢¡
¡
¡
xi ¡ ei¢¡´
·
X
i
xi =
X
i
ei;
which contradicts supportability.
33